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BARNES V. STATE: A SUSPECT’S DETENTION DID NOT 
EVOLVE INTO DE FACTO ARREST WHEN THE 
EXECUTION OF A WARRANT WAS DELAYED FOR THREE 
HOURS; POLICE MAY DETAIN A SUSPECT AFTER THE 
WARRANT EXECUTION IF THEY REASONABLY SUSPECT 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
 
By: Harrison Bliss 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a three-hour delay in the 
execution of a warrant was reasonable and did not constitute de facto arrest.  
Barnes v. State, 437 Md. 375, 394, 86 A.3d 1246, 1257 (2014).  The court of 
appeals also held that a short investigatory detention, following the execution 
of the warrant, did not suggest de facto arrest, and therefore did not require 
probable cause.  Id. at 397, 86 A.3d at 1259.  Finally, the court held that the 
evidence collected from the search of an individual’s storage unit was 
lawfully obtained because the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion 
to detain the individual when he consented to the search.  Id. at 399, 86 A.3d 
at 1260.  
     On January 14, 2009, Prince George’s County Police discovered the 
bodies of Seth Aidoo and Eunice Baah in Mr. Aidoo’s home, after receiving 
a 911 call from a concerned friend.  It was determined the victims were 
likely murdered on January 12, 2009.  During their investigation, detectives 
discovered that Sheila Aidoo and her brother, Samuel Culley Jr. (“Culley”), 
had previously lived with Mr. Aidoo.  However, at the time of the murders, 
Ms. Aidoo and Culley were living with Delford Mitchell Barnes (“Barnes”) 
in Ms. Aidoo’s home.  
     Detectives further discovered that Culley had obtained a transponder to 
enter Mr. Aidoo’s gated community while residing at Mr. Aidoo’s home.  
Video surveillance showed Barnes’ vehicle using that same transponder to 
enter the community approximately two weeks before the murders.  
Additionally, a mini-van entered Mr. Aidoo’s gated community, using the 
same transponder, on the evening of the murders. 
     On February 18, 2009, detectives obtained a warrant to collect Barnes’ 
DNA and fingerprints, as well as to search Ms. Aidoo’s residence and 
Barnes’ car.  The following evening, police stopped Barnes and asked him to 
come to the station to execute the warrant for his DNA and fingerprints.  
Barnes agreed and was transported to the police station.  Upon arrival, 
Barnes was placed in an interview room where the door remained unlocked 
and Barnes was unrestrained.  
     Meanwhile, other detectives executed the search warrant for Ms. Aidoo’s 
residence, which ultimately delayed police from taking Barnes’ DNA and 
fingerprints for approximately three to four hours.  After Barnes’ DNA and 
105 
106 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 45.1 
 
fingerprints were taken, Barnes was escorted to the restroom to wash his 
hands.  Upon returning to the interview room, police immediately questioned 
Barnes about a storage unit receipt found at Ms. Aidoo’s residence.  Barnes 
confirmed that the storage unit belonged to him and gave the police consent 
to search the unit approximately seven minutes after his return to the 
interview room.  The search of Barnes’ storage unit revealed a candle etched 
with Mr. Aidoo’s address and several statements regarding Mr. Aidoo, such 
as “Seth please die,” and “I want you to take a knife & kill yourself.”  Barnes 
was subsequently arrested and charged with premeditated murder. 
     Barnes filed a motion to suppress the candle, claiming that it was the 
product of an unlawful detention and therefore was inadmissible.  The 
suppression court denied Barnes’ motion and Barnes was convicted on two 
counts of first-degree murder.  On appeal, the court of special appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding the delay to be reasonable, and 
Barnes’ second detention lawful.  Barnes petitioned for a writ of certiorari, 
which the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted. 
     The court of appeals applied a deferential standard of review, relying 
solely on the record from the suppression hearing and viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.  Barnes, 437 Md. at 389, 
86 A.3d at 1254 (citing Briscoe v. State, 422 Md. 384, 30 A.3d 870 (2011)).  
The factual findings of the suppression court were upheld because they were 
not clearly erroneous; however, the court of appeals made its own 
independent evaluation constitutional evaluation.  Id. at 389, 86 A.3d at 
1254-55 (citing State v. Luckett, 413 Md. 360, 375 n. 3, 993 A.2d 25 (2010); 
Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 148–49, 12 A.3d 1238 (2011)). 
     The court of appeals began its analysis by concluding that any non-
consensual detention of a person constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Barnes, 437 Md. at 390, 86 A.3d at 1255.  The court stated that 
Fourth Amendment seizures fall into one of two categories.  Id.  First, a 
formal or de facto arrest, requiring probable cause that the suspect was 
involved in criminal activity.  Id. (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 
370 (2003)).  Second, a more limited stop of an individual, requiring only 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.  Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968)).     
     In addressing whether the delay in the execution of the warrant for 
Barnes’ DNA and fingerprints was reasonable, the court referred to the 
testimony of two detectives from the suppression hearing, which showed that 
no one was available to execute the warrant during the delay.  Barnes, 437 
Md. at 392-93, 86 A.3d at 1256-57. The court stated that its task was not to 
speculate on whether police could have executed the warrant sooner, but 
only to determine if the delay was reasonable.  Id. at 394, 86 A.3d at 1257.  
Ultimately, the court held that Barnes’ initial detention never evolved into de 
facto arrest. Id.  The delay in warrant execution was found to be reasonable 
due to the lack of available detectives to carry it out. Id.  
     Additionally, the court of appeals addressed whether Barnes’ second 
detention constituted de facto arrest without probable cause.  Barnes, 437 
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Md. at 394-95, 86 A.3d at 1257-58.  Relying on Dunaway v. New York, 
Barnes argued that the circumstances of his detention had the attributes of a 
formal arrest, thus requiring probable cause.  Id. at 395-96, 86 A.3d at 1258 
(citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)).  Rejecting this 
argument, the court identified the crucial distinctions between an arrestee 
being detained based on mere suspicion, as in Dunaway, and the detention of 
an arrestee incident to the execution of a lawful warrant.  Barnes, 437 Md. at 
396, 86 A.3d at 1268. 
     The court of appeals disagreed finding that Barnes was lawfully detained 
for three hours to execute a warrant, whereas Dunaway was held under 
prolonged investigatory detention by police without a warrant or other 
official grounds to detain him.  Barnes, 437 Md. at 397, 86 A.3d at 1259.  
The court held that Barnes was not under de facto arrest during the second 
detention because it was brief and less intrusive than in Dunaway, and 
therefore probable cause was not required. Id. 
     The court of appeals then addressed whether the detectives had the 
requisite reasonable suspicion to detain Barnes following the execution of 
the warrant.  Barnes, 437 Md. at 398, 86 A.3d at 1259. In emphasizing the 
distinction between reasonable suspicion and probable cause, the court stated 
that the former is a less demanding standard than the latter.  Id. at 398, 86 
A.3d at 1260 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).  Based on 
the evidence that initially allowed police to obtain the warrant for Barnes’ 
DNA and fingerprints, the court held that the detectives had reasonable 
suspicion that Barnes was involved in the murders at the time they entered 
the interview room to question Barnes about the storage locker.  Id. at 398-
99, 86 A.3d at 1260.  Because the detectives obtained Barnes’ consent to 
search his locker during a lawful detention, the court held that all evidence 
resulting from the search of his locker was admissible.  Barnes, 437 Md. at 
398-99, 86 A.3d at 1260.    
     In Barnes, the court of appeals held that a delay in the execution of a 
search and seizure warrant is lawful if it is deemed reasonable.  This ruling 
makes it clear that the courts give police wide discretion to conduct 
investigations in the manner they see fit.  Such discretion discourages 
defense counsel from challenging the reasonableness of a delay in the 
execution of a warrant because it is unlikely that a court will find the delay 
unreasonable.  When delays such as the one in Barnes are deemed 
reasonable, the likelihood for coercion increases.  A suspect may be 
convinced or browbeaten into giving police search consent or a confession 
during a prolonged detention.  This ruling shows that such a confession or 
consent will likely be found to be valid which is troublesome because it 
shows that the rights of criminal suspects have been eroded.  
 
 
